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I. INTRODUCTION	
In “Enduring Originalism,”2 Jeffrey Pojanowski and Kevin C. Walsh 
outline how originalism in constitutional interpretation can be grounded in 
modern natural law theory as developed by John Finnis. Their argument to 
that effect is powerful and constitutes a welcome addition both to natural 
law theory and to originalist theory. However, the authors chose to present 
their account as a superior alternative to, or modification of, “positive” 
(“original-law”) originalism of Stephen Sachs and William Baude.3 It is that 
aspect of the paper that I focus on in this short essay. Contrary to their 
strong claims in that direction, Professors Pojanowski and Walsh are far 
from establishing that positive originalism is deficient and that that their 
version of natural-law-based originalism offers a plausible alternative to 
positivist originalism.4 There is also a worry that, despite professing 
sympathy towards the “positive turn” in originalism, “Enduring 
Originalism” is at its core an account of what Professors Pojanowski and 
                                                
1 University College, University of Oxford; from July 2017, Lecturer (Assistant 
Professor) in Public Law and Legal Theory at the University of Surrey. Thanks to 
William Baude, Jeffrey Pojanowski, Stephen Sachs, and Kevin Walsh. The usual 
disclaimer applies. 
Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and distribute copies of this 
Essay in any format, at or below cost, for educational purposes, so long as each 
copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review 
Online, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.  
2 Jeffrey Pojanowski & Kevin C. Walsh, Enduring Originalism, 105 GEO. L.J. 97 
(2016). 
3 Stephen E. Sachs, The “Constitution in Exile” as a Problem for Legal Theory, 89 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2253 (2014); Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of 
Legal Change, 38 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 817 (2015); William Baude, Is 
Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349 (2015). See also Richard 
Primus, Is Theocracy Our Politics?, 116 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW SIDEBAR 44 
(2016); Charles L. Barzun, The Positive U-turn,  STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2017). 
4 In what follows I refer to the theory advanced by Professors Pojanowski and 
Walsh as “natural law originalism.” 
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Walsh think the law should be, and not what the law is; precisely the kind of 
argument the positive turn militates against. 
II. GETTING	CLEAR	ABOUT	POSITIVITY	
Professors Pojanowski and Walsh insist that their account builds on the 
“positive turn” and that they offer “positive-law-based arguments for 
constitutional originalism.”5 The latter is true. They argue that in the 
“classical natural law” framework there is a special understanding of 
stipulated positive law.6 Because the Constitution was made as stipulated 
positive law, it belongs to “the kind of fixed, authoritative, and enduring” 
law.7 And laws of this kind call for an appropriate kind of interpretation: an 
originalist one.8 In this sense, Professors Pojanowski and Walsh are 
“positivity-welcomers.”9 They think it is a (morally) valuable thing to have 
enacted laws and to treat them as “fixed, authoritative, and enduring.”10 I am 
not disputing that. 
However, this is an entirely different understanding of “positive” from 
the one that animates the “positive turn” of Professors Baude and Sachs. It 
would be an equivocation to refer to this kind of originalism and to natural 
law originalism of Professors Pojanowski and Walsh using the same label of 
“positive originalism.”11 Professors Baude and Sachs (the latter more 
forcefully) rely on legal positivism.12 Legal positivism of the kind that 
Professors Baude and Sachs employ is a theory of law according to which 
all valid law at any point in time is grounded in a special social practice of a 
certain group of people of recognizing certain things as law. This view 
comes from HLA Hart, who argued that a social practice of legal officials 
grounds “the ultimate rule of recognition” of every legal system.13 For a 
Hartian legal positivist, there could be no law that is not grounded in the 
current social practice of recognition.  
                                                
5 Pojanowski and Walsh, supra note 2, at 99. 
6 Id. at 122–126. 
7 Id. at 152. 
8 Id. at 125–126. 
9 John Gardner, Legal Positivism: 5½ Myths, in LAW AS A LEAP OF FAITH 19, 26–
27 (2012). 
10 Pojanowski and Walsh, supra note 2, at 152. 
11 It is not the case that their argument is “positive” in the sense positive originalists 
use the term, contra Id. at 100 (“This argument is both ‘positive’ and ‘normative,’ 
in the sense that Baude and Sachs use these terms.”). 
12 Baude, supra note 3, at 2364–2365; Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal 
Change, supra note 3, at 835–838; Pojanowski and Walsh, supra note 2, at 99.  
13 HERBERT L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 94–95, 105–106 (3rd ed. 2012). 
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The first question a positivist then asks is: what is the content of the 
current practice of recognition? And here we run into a problem with 
positivity-welcoming natural lawyers. There is no necessity that the current 
practice of recognition will treat enacted laws as “fixed” and “enduring.” In 
fact, it could adopt a universal “living instrument” approach to all enacted 
law, including a codified constitution. Hence, legal positivism allows for the 
possibility in which a legal system has no “positivity” of the kind Professors 
Pojanowski and Walsh think valuable. Whether there is any such 
“positivity” is a contingent empirical question. A positivist stresses that all 
law is “posited” not in the sense that it is intentionally made (at least some 
of it clearly is not, e.g. customary law), but because at every point in time all 
law is grounded in a current pattern of human thoughts and actions. 
The positive turn of Professors Baude and Sachs has at its core the 
claim that as a matter of contingent social fact it is the case that the current 
practice of recognition of US law is fundamentally committed to “original 
law” originalism.14 Professors Pojanowski and Walsh seem to suggest that 
there is no such fact, that what obtains is “constitutional eclectism.”15 Or, in 
other words, that the practice of recognition is not determinate on this 
point.16 Both Professor Baude17 and Professors Sachs18 anticipate that 
possibility. Unsurprisingly, they both think that the challenge can be met 
(otherwise they would have been positive nonoriginalists).  
It could be, as Professors Baude and Sachs suggest, that the current rule 
of recognition of US law has as its supreme provision19 a duty to recognize 
as valid US law only that which has the pedigree of unbroken continuity of 
lawful change since the Founding. If this is the claim of positive 
originalism, then it certainly is not – pace Professors Pojanowski and Walsh 
– “a history of Supreme Court attitudes and practices”20 for the simple 
reason that the rule of recognition is constituted by attitudes of a much 
broader group. It is also not true that this framework does not tell us whose 
attitudes (“internal perspective”) counts.21 Yes, there is some disagreement 
                                                
14 See supra note 11. 
15 Pojanowski and Walsh, supra note 2, at 135–138. See also infra sec. IV-V. For 
more detailed criticism along these lines, see Primus, supra note 3; Barzun, supra 
note 3. 
16 Pojanowski and Walsh, supra note 2, at 105–106, 108–109. 
17 Baude, supra note 3, at 2403. 
18 Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, supra note 3, at 822. 
19 Rules of recognition may be internally structured. Alternatively, one might say 
that there is a hierarchy of rules of recognition. Nothing hangs on that as long as 
there are no conflicting rules of recognition in a society. 
20 Pojanowski and Walsh, supra note 2, at 114–115. 
21 Contra Id. at 111, 116, 125. 
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on that point in the literature and Professors Baude and Sachs do not commit 
themselves to a specific position on who counts as a member of the 
recognitional community. However, the best view is that the group (as 
Matthew Adler calls it, “recognitional community”22) includes all members 
of the society who recognize each other as having a legal power 
authoritatively to apply the law (to say what it is in a given case).23 In what 
follows, I will refer to them simply as ‘legal officials’. Any consensus 
(overlap) of their attitudes is likely to be shallow and narrow.  
On one hand, this narrowness makes it more probable that the consensus 
needed to make the central claim of positive originalism true does not obtain 
(i.e. the legal officials are not committed to the original law in the way 
Professors Baude and Sachs argue).24 On the other hand, it could very well 
be that the Supreme Court is undermining the law we discover by paying 
attention to the higher-order principles accepted by other legal officials. 
Private “attitudes and practices” of the Supreme Court that are not shared in 
the wider recognitional community do not ground the rule of recognition. 
Hence, focusing on what the majority of the Court thought in some case, or 
what would have happened if they said something else, is far from being the 
positivist method. Natural law originalists and positive originalists can agree 
that “the (case) law of the Supreme Court” is not identical with “the law of 
the Constitution.” 
That the social practice of recognition of law is not determinately 
originalist is not the authors’ main criticism of positivist originalism. Their 
main criticism is that Hartian positivist originalism is yet to provide a 
practical (normative) “reason to be an originalist.”25 I will come back to that 
issue in sec. VI.  
III. THE	CENTRAL	CASE	OF	THE	INTERNAL	POINT	OF	VIEW	
I now turn to the core of the case Professors Pojanowski and Walsh 
make for their natural law originalism. Seeing the limitations of that 
                                                
22 Matthew Adler, Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition: Whose 
Practices Ground U.S. Law?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 719, 726 (2006). 
23 See, e.g., John Gardner, Why Law Might Emerge: Hart’s Problematic Fable, in 
READING HLA HART’S “THE CONCEPT OF LAW” (Luis Duarte d’Almeida, James 
Edwards, & Andrea Dolcetti eds., 2013) 
24 Professors Pojanowski and Walsh are correct in saying that: “[i]t is hard to 
establish that originalism is in fact the master interpretive convention in a univocal 
rule of recognition that all relevant practitioners regard as obligatory.” Pojanowski 
and Walsh, supra note 2, at 116. The goal of Professors Baude and Sachs is to 
show that there is such a shared commitment, not that it is easy to do so, see Baude, 
supra note 3, at 2403; Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, supra note 
3, at 822. See also Pojanowski and Walsh, supra note 2, at 105–108.  
25 Pojanowski and Walsh, supra note 2, at 116. 
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argument will allow me to say something about relative merits of positivist 
and natural law originalisms. 
Professors Pojanowski and Walsh are skeptical that positive originalism 
of Professors Baude and Sachs succeeds on its own terms, because they are 
skeptical that there is sufficient agreement among US legal officials on that 
point.26 This is a fair point and it may well be right. If it is, then positivists 
must reject originalism as an account of the law as it is. However, this is not 
necessarily the end of the road for natural law originalism.  
A natural law originalist may say that even though the relevant social 
practice is not settled on the point of originalism, even though there is 
fundamental disagreement, the nature of the US law tells us how to resolve 
the disagreement.27 How? In brief, by taking the perspective (“the internal 
point of view”) of “the practically reasonable person.”28 In other words, by 
siding with one party of the disagreement. Instead of throwing up one’s 
hands in the situation of fundamental disagreement as to the content of the 
law and saying that there is no legal fact of the matter (the law is not settled, 
indeterminate), a natural lawyer says that there is a legal (legally required) 
answer. This is undoubtedly a very alluring conclusion. It may seem more 
alluring than the positivist solution, which is to admit that in some cases the 
law allows legal officials to exercise discretion and to provide authoritative 
settlement which is not uniquely legally required, but merely legally 
permitted. 
The problem is with where does a natural lawyer get his legally required 
answer. Who is the practically reasonable person? Stripping the account of 
technical language, a natural lawyer claims that this is a person who does 
what morality really requires. The “central case” of law identified by the 
practically reasonable person is law that actually realizes the moral values 
that law is supposed to realize (contributing to the common good of 
maintain a “complete political community”). So, where does the 
disagreement-settling legal answer come from? From morality. To be clear, 
the last point is also, in a sense, true of legal positivism. The difference is 
that positivists do not claim that the way discretion was exercised in any 
given case was legally required. Hence, positivism does not take sides in 
meta-ethical debates in a way that natural law does. For natural lawyers this 
counts in favor of natural law, for everyone else it counts against it (see sec. 
VI).29 
                                                
26 See infra sec. V. 
27 Pojanowski and Walsh, supra note 2, at 125. 
28 Id. at 125. 
29 It counts against natural law jurisprudence to the extent it purports to be a theory 
of the content of the law and not how the content of the law should be changed. 
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 IV. COMPATIBILITY	OF	NATURAL	LAW	AND	POSITIVIST	ORIGINALISMS		
There is a considerable space for compatibility between natural law 
originalism and positivist originalism. As I show in sec. V, on some 
readings of “Enduring Originalism” it could be fully endorsed by a legal 
positivist.  
A positivist has no reason to reject rather uncontroversial view that we 
all should be doing the morally right thing and that this applies to legal 
officials as well. However, potential for compatibility between the two 
jurisprudential views goes beyond that.  
For instance, what if legal officials fail to do the morally right thing in 
identifying the content of the law? A positivist and a modern natural 
lawyer30 may very well agree that we then end up with law that is a legally 
deficient, non-central (non-paradigmatic) case of law.31 There is likely to be 
disagreement between a positivist and a natural lawyer as to what exactly is 
the central case of law. A positivist may be more inclined to identify it with 
the ideal of legality (of the rule of law),32 which a natural lawyer may find 
too thin (not encompassing all that is morally valuable about the central case 
of law). 
A modern natural lawyer cannot even make arguments from the central 
case of law to the content of the law as practiced (i.e. to argue from “moral 
ought” to “legal is”), if the legal practice in question is settled (determinate). 
Following Professor Finnis, “reformed” natural law theorists like Professors 
Pojanowski and Walsh cannot say that a “formally or intra-systemically 
valid law” is simply not law.33 The new natural lawyers do not take the 
maxim lex iniusta non est lex literally.34 Professor Finnis is very careful to 
limit himself to statements like:  
any significant injustice in making or content deprives a law or 
legal decision of that moral respect-worthiness that every formally 
or intra-systemically valid law and decision within a by-and-large 
just legal system has …35 
                                                
30 As opposed to “hard-core” natural lawyers who, unlike Professors Pojanowski 
and Walsh, think that unjust law literally is not law. See, e.g., Norman Kretzmann, 
Lex Iniusta Non est Lex - Laws on Trial in Aquinas’ Court of Conscience, 33 AM. 
J. JURIS. 99 (1988). See also Pojanowski and Walsh, supra note 2, at 118 n.118. 
31 John Gardner, Law as a Leap of Faith as Others See It, 33 LAW AND 
PHILOSOPHY 813, 837–842 (2014) 
32 JOHN GARDNER, LAW AS A LEAP OF FAITH 229 (2012). 
33 John Finnis, Law as Fact and as Reason for Action: A Response to Robert Alexy 
on Law’s “Ideal Dimension,” 59 AM. J. JURIS. 85, 107 (2014). 
34 There are natural lawyers who oppose this trend, see supra note 36. 
35 Finnis, supra note 42, at 107. 
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In other words, not being like the law natural law theory imagines, has 
the consequence of “deprivation” of “moral respect-worthiness” for that 
law. In the same paper, Professor Finnis adds: “… [u]njust laws, despite 
their intra-systemic validity, are not reasons of the authentically legal kind 
that law should exist to create …”.36 So those “unjust laws” are valid laws, 
but do not create reasons for action of a special moral kind. There are two 
crucial lessons here: (1) natural law theory to be of any plausibility to 
a modern lawyer must take on board the positivist concept of 
“intra-systemic validity” and, relatedly, (2) natural law theory does not 
claim that, as a matter of “intra-systemic validity,” content of legal norms is 
necessarily affected by what morality requires. That is, modern natural 
lawyer cannot say that his jurisprudential theory can change “… the fact that 
others treat these laws as legally valid…”.37 
Hence, if a law is settled as a matter of “intra-systemic validity” (for a 
positivist this translates simply to “validity”) and is morally bad, a modern 
natural lawyer can only say that it is non-paradigmatic. She cannot say that 
that the law actually has a different, morally correct, content. But what if the 
content of the law is not settled as a matter of “intra-systemic validity”? 
This is where Professors Pojanowski and Walsh come in and say that the 
nature of US law requires officials to choose the morally (and thus legally) 
correct answer.38 To an extent, even a hard-core legal positivist must allow 
for the possibility that they are correct. But it is not a straightforward thing 
to show. 
First, it is contentious that morality does require US legal officials to be 
originalists,39 but let us assume that it does. This is a crucial assumption and 
the project of natural law originalism falls if it cannot be substantiated. 
Professors Pojanowski and Walsh do not deny this and aim to show that, 
given some salient features of US constitutional history, morality requires 
originalism in the US today.40  
Second, neither the argument from historical understandings of the kind 
of law the Constitution is,41 nor the moral argument on that point,42 are 
                                                
36 Id. at 107. 
37 Id. at 107. 
38 Pojanowski and Walsh, supra note 2, at 153, 155. 
39 Moral arguments, and especially all-things-considered moral arguments, about 
such complex things as the US constitutional settlement are rather tricky. 
Professors Pojanowski and Walsh recognize this and they end up with a version of 
the precautionary principle combined with a claim that the original Constitution is 
good enough (sufficiently just), see Id. at 155. Naturally, even that is contentious. 
40 See Id. at 126–135, 149–157. 
41 Id. at 126–135. 
42 Id. at 119–126. 
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sufficient. It must still be established, as a matter of current legal practice, 
that originalism is not legally precluded and that legal officials have 
discretion to make the choice in favour of originalism. What needs to be 
shown is that there is a legal gap and that the officials are at least legally 
permitted to fill it by reference to the sort of arguments that Professors 
Pojanowski and Walsh use. This is not just a requirement of legal 
positivism, but as my discussion of Professor Finnis’ view showed, it is also 
a requirement of modern natural law theory. If the “intra-systemically valid” 
law is settled, then there is no choice to be made. Professors Pojanowski and 
Walsh have written: 
We agree that the case for originalism is contingent on continued 
adherence to the concept of our Constitution to which it is attached. 
But that continued adherence depends on choice and cannot be 
resolved by reference to social facts alone. In our constitutional 
order, a fixed, authoritative, enduring, stipulated positive-law 
Constitution is not the only official story on offer.43 
This may very well be, but why is the choice legally open? And why is 
it open to be settled by the kind of moral and historical arguments that 
Professors Pojanowski and Walsh use? Social facts alone determine 
“intra-systemic validity” and hence whether a point of law is settled in that 
sense or not. The authors noted that: “… insofar as the original law of the 
Constitution underdetermines legal questions within its domain, the system 
needs legal conventions for rendering the law sufficiently determinate.”44 
However, they argue for their favored conventions referring to the 
choice made by the makers of the Constitution and to a moral argument. 
Neither of which is a proper argument about the content of contemporary 
law unless one has already shown that contemporary law invites (or 
incorporates) these sorts of arguments. The choice made by the makers may 
be determinative if positivist originalism is correct about current legal 
practices, but this is precisely what Professors Pojanowski and Walsh are 
skeptical of. 
Perhaps Professors Pojanowski and Walsh believe that, at least in US 
law, it is the case that whenever “intra-systemically valid” law is 
indeterminate there is a general legal permission for legal officials to make 
it determinate by exercising their legal powers, e.g. powers to adjudicate. To 
be more precise: a general permission to make it determinate by reference to 
the sort of arguments (moral and historical) that Professors Pojanowski and 
Walsh make. Again, I do not deny this possibility, but it cannot just be 
                                                
43 Id. at 153. 
44 Id. at 142. 
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assumed. The authors have more explaining to do. In the next section, 
I discuss what that explanation may be. 
V. WHERE	NATURAL	LAW	AND	POSITIVIST	ORIGINALISMS	COME	APART	(MAYBE)	
At least some of the claims of a natural law originalist, about 
paradigmatic (central) cases of law and about how morality may require 
developing indeterminate “intra-systemically valid” law to make it 
originalist, are compatible with legal positivism. The compatibility stems 
from the fact that legal positivism does not preclude them and is shown by 
the fact that some legal positivists endorse versions of those claims. 
Naturally, they do not do so qua legal positivists, just like mathematicians 
who are vegetarians are not so qua being mathematicians. Legal positivism, 
just like any theory, has a limited domain and the aforementioned claims of 
natural law originalism do not conflict with this limited domain. Due to its 
acceptance of “intra-systemic validity” as a social fact, modern natural law 
theory is positivism-friendly. 
Nevertheless, as I already noted in sec. II, a positivist originalist and a 
natural law originalist may have different starting points. A positivist starts 
with the current social practice of recognition of law. For her, there is no 
sense whatsoever in which “original law” is currently law, unless she 
already concluded that the current practice of recognition makes it so. It is 
not entirely clear whether Professors Pojanowski and Walsh endorse this or 
not. 
Take, for instance, their example of “mental age” and “chronological 
age” versions of the constitutional age requirement for becoming 
President.45 Once they assume “that the correct legal meaning fixed as an 
original matter is ‘chronological age’,” then they state confidently “[t]hat is 
the law.”46 On their view, it would even be so if all the federal courts had 
accepted the “mental age” version. They have written: “[t]he fixed meaning 
of the written Constitution remains law of a certain kind even if the 
Supreme Court ignores it or casts it aside. This persistence as positive law 
of a sort may seem counterintuitive, but it is real.”47  
The way the authors phrased the last quoted passage makes it acceptable 
to a positivist. As Professor Sachs correctly argues, there could be a 
“constitution in exile.”48 But this is only possible if there is agreement 
among legal officials in the form of a “higher-order belief” in some feature 
                                                
45 Id. at 150–151. 
46 Id. at 150–151. 
47 Id. at 150–151. 
48 Sachs, The “Constitution in Exile” as a Problem for Legal Theory, supra note 3. 
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of law that those officials, or some subset of them, fail to adhere to in 
practice. A positivist need not endorse the “narrow sense” of “the law” as 
merely “the law that should be applied in courts until the Supreme Court 
changes its tune.”49 
A positivist will also allow for the possibility that “the output of 
original-law originalism is law”50 even when it is not in practice applied by 
courts. As the authors say, it could be a distinct question whether it is 
“available for adoption as the law to govern a particular case,” and that this 
“depends on what other law may be on point.”51  
The big question is whether Professors Pojanowski and Walsh go 
beyond that? Whether they claim that even if there is no such enduring 
“higher-order” agreement among legal officials, some feature of the law 
could endure despite being rejected in practice?  
The authors are not overly explicit about that, but some of their remarks 
suggest that they do not claim that originalism can never be abandoned in 
the US. There is some limitation. For instance, they said: “[a]s long as this 
conception of the Law of the Constitution endures, legal actors have 
available a potentially winning argument based on it.”52 What does it mean 
for the conception of this kind to endure if it means something other than an 
enduring agreement of higher-order beliefs? What is it for the Constitution 
to “keep its soul”?53  
Professors Pojanowski and Walsh are somewhat cryptic as to whether 
they believe in existence of ‘Sachsian’ social facts making it the case that 
positive originalism succeeds on its own terms. They recount the standard, 
fair objections to the empirical claims made by positive originalists.54 And 
then they say that they will not try to adjudicate this, because: “these are not 
our concerns, or at least not directly.”55 I do not think this way out is open to 
them. What is at stake is a core question about their own theory and the 
extent of its commitment to the “positive turn” in originalism. 
I see three possible readings of this core aspect of the argument in 
“Enduring Originalism.” The first one is fully compatible with positivist 
originalism. The remaining two are independent from positivist originalism, 
but are compatible with legal positivism. 
                                                
49 Pojanowski and Walsh, supra note 2, at 151. 
50 Id. at 154. 
51 Id. at 154. 
52 Id. at 149. 
53 Id. at 158. 
54 Id. at 108–109. 
55 Id. at 109. 
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The	first	option	
The authors said: 
The best explanation for the endurance of originalism in practice, 
we contend, is the endurance of the idea of the written Constitution 
as fixed, stipulated positive law. Some version of constitutional 
originalism will always be attractive for interpreters as long as the 
Constitution is widely enough understood as the kind of legal 
instrument that it was designed to be—superior law authoritatively 
fixed until lawfully changed.56 
One possible reading of what Professors Pojanowski and Walsh are 
saying is that they concur with Professor Sachs that there is an agreement 
among contemporary US legal officials of relevant higher-order beliefs 
making it legally the case that original law is law. On this reading, the added 
value of natural law originalism is in helping to explain why US officials 
accept this idea of the Constitution and to justify in moral terms that they 
continue so to accept.57 Hence, despite their protestations to the contrary, 
Professors Pojanowski and Walsh are legal positivists who are also natural 
lawyers. 
If this is what natural law originalism boils down to, then a positivist 
may be tempted to say that it is not much. Both the explanation and the 
justification are highly contentious and, in any case, they are not necessary 
to establish that the original law is law, once it is already established that the 
relevant higher-order agreement obtains. 
The	second	option	
Perhaps the authors do not believe that there is a higher-order agreement 
that makes it the case that originalism is law in the sense Professor Sachs 
presents. They said, for instance: “[i]t is hard to establish that originalism is 
in fact the master interpretive convention in a univocal rule of recognition 
that all relevant practitioners regard as obligatory.”58 And: “[originalism] is 
not as ascendant as advocates of the positive turn claim, but its legal force is 
nonetheless real.”59 There would still be a need to explain their statements 
like the following: “[t]he social facts the positive turn identifies will be 
                                                
56 Id. at 149. Similarly: “… our constitutional order maintains fundamental 
continuity as long as there remains some fidelity to the concept of the Constitution 
as stipulated, fixed positive law that interpreters should approach with interpretive 
conventions proper to such a document.” Id. at 152. 
57 See, e.g., Pojanowski and Walsh, supra note 2, at 116. 
58 Id. at 116. 
59 Id. at 155. 
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crucial, even if they are not sufficient to tell a court how to interpret the 
Constitution.”60 
My best guess of what Professors Pojanowski and Walsh mean on the 
assumption that they disagree with Professor Sachs is that they think there is 
a lower threshold of agreement for higher-order beliefs to ground legal 
facts. In a different passage, they said: “… our constitutional order 
maintains fundamental continuity as long as there remains some fidelity” to 
the originalist concept of the Constitution.61 Perhaps, “some fidelity” is less 
than the kind of agreement a Hartian positivist sees as necessary to 
constitute ultimate legal facts (contents of the ultimate rule of recognition). 
If this is their view, then it is substantially different from that of a positivist 
originalist like Professor Sachs.  
What Professors Pojanowski and Walsh said in the introduction 
supports this reading: 
On our approach, originalism stands even if many legal participants 
reject originalism or merely pay lip service to it. What is decisive is 
the point of view of the morally reasonable person toward the 
social fact of our stipulated positive-law Constitution—not social 
facts about what today’s legal officials happen to believe about 
interpretive method. And the practically reasonable person’s 
attitude toward our Constitution, we argue, should be originalist.62 
The authors hinted at their solution by saying: “[a]ccordingly, the 
interpretive revolution that seeks to depart from the understanding of the 
Constitution as stipulated positive law is not complete. This contested state 
of affairs still offers a live choice between original-law-ism and living 
constitutionalism.”63 
There are two ways to interpret the “live choice” solution. The first 
would be to say that there is higher-order agreement in US legal practice 
that indeterminacy in law is to be settled by the methods that Professors 
Pojanowski and Walsh employ (moral and historical). Or as the authors 
would prefer to phrase it: 
As long as disagreement about the nature of the Constitution as a 
legal instrument persists, a shared understanding of what to argue 
about in arguing for a particular set of interpretive conventions is 
not enough to enable identification of a full set of interpretive 
conventions for the Constitution. There will be no normative lens 
                                                
60 Id. at 116. 
61 Id. at 152. 
62 Id. at 100–101. 
63 Id. at 155. 
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through which to filter conflicts between interpretive conventions. 
But insofar as there is agreement on some of this legal instrument’s 
legal qualities, there can be agreement on some of the interpretive 
conventions appropriate to it.64 
Hence, on this view it could conceivably be claimed that natural law 
originalism is required by current law (not only permitted or not precluded). 
If such higher-order agreement really obtains, then a legal positivist would 
have no problem admitting as much. She may only have qualms about 
labelling the result of this legally required process as “law” before the 
officials adhere to their legal duties and “turn originalist.”65 But she would 
admit the result as legally required. 
Of course, this claim about the social facts at the foundation of US law 
would face the same sort of objections the empirical claim of positive 
originalism faces. Maybe it would be easier to prove, maybe not. One might 
worry that Professors Pojanowski and Walsh are attempting to pack too 
much of their conclusion into the social fact of “agreement on some of this 
legal instrument’s [i.e. the Constitution’s] legal qualities.”66 Whereas the 
content of that social fact is perhaps thinner and leaves us only with the 
following alternative. 
The	third	option	
The second way to interpret the “live choice” solution is that Professors 
Pojanowski and Walsh rely only on existence of a general legal permission 
for legal officials to use their legal powers to settle disagreements in the 
law. On this scenario, all support originalism needs in terms of social facts 
is that it is one seriously held view among others. This alone makes it 
eligible to be “chosen.”  
A positivist description of this scenario would be that the law is not 
originalist now, but could be made so in a way that is neither legally 
required not precluded. Any duty to develop the law in the originalist 
direction could only be a non-legal duty (e.g. a moral duty). 
Regarding the second and third options, a natural lawyer might want to 
say more about the content of US law. She may claim both that (1) the 
choice to change the law as practiced is legally required because such is the 
central case of US law and that (2) the result of the choice is law, 
irrespective of whether it is law as practiced. 
                                                
64 Id. at 142. 
65 Just because you can impose on someone who has a power to change the law a 
legal duty to exercise that power in a certain way, it does not follow that your 
imposition of that duty is identical with changing the law. They might fail to obey. 
66 Pojanowski and Walsh, supra note 2, at 142 
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This is where the natural lawyer goes too far. Those two additional 
claims about the content of law are both implausible (see below) and 
incompatible with “positivity” of law viewed as the notion that all currently 
valid law is grounded in the current social reality. A positivist takes social 
reality as it is: if there is fundamental disagreement, there is no law. 
A natural law originalist, on this reading, is not satisfied with that. She picks 
one side in such fundamental disagreement and decrees it correct, based 
ultimately on her account of what morality requires. This does sound very 
much like “a flight from constitutional positivity.”67 
However, a natural lawyer need not make those additional claims. She 
could be satisfied with claiming that the central case of US law established a 
moral ideal and that legal officials have a moral duty to use the legal powers 
they have as a matter of social fact to make US law conform to that ideal. 
This, to me, seems like a coherent and potentially plausible argument. Not 
to mention, one fully compatible with legal positivism. Yes, it is merely a 
moral argument for legal reform (informed by legal history), but it avoids 
identifying the law as it is with the law as it should be. 
VI. THE	BEST	REASONS	TO	BE	AN	ORIGINALIST	
A practically reasonable vampire, I am told, would not enter a house 
uninvited. A similar thing is true about natural lawyers. They know that if 
they want to engage in a debate with legal positivists and avoid a charge of 
having an entirely different conversation (talking past one another), it is a 
good idea for them to be invited. A positivist may provide such an “in” by 
opening a particular discussion to considerations of genuine normativity 
(simplifying: to what is morally, not just legally, required). Professors 
Pojanowski and Walsh notice that Professors Baude and Sachs did so by 
attempting to provide an account of “how judges ought to decide cases”68 
and of “the best reason to be an originalist.”69 Two questions immediately 
arise:  
(1) What does it mean to be or to have “the best reason to be an 
originalist”?  
(2) Who provides “the best reason to be an originalist”? 
What are the reasons in question and what are they reasons for? What is 
it to “be an originalist”? One could be an originalist in the sense of believing 
                                                
67 Id. at 151. Unless, of course, “positivity” is simply defined as treating the 
Constitution as “fixed, authoritative, and enduring” but that is precisely what is to 
be shown. 
68 Baude, supra note 3, at 2392. 
69 Pojanowski and Walsh, supra note 2, at 15 n.96 citing Sachs, Originalism as a 
Theory of Legal Change, supra note 3, at 822. 
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that originalism correctly describes current positive law of the US. This is 
the claim made by Professor Sachs.70 Professors Pojanowski and Walsh are 
not satisfied with that.71 They claim that the method employed by positive 
originalism “does not give any reason” to be an originalist.72 What they 
seem to mean by “being an originalist,” is not only having the belief 
I mentioned, but also accepting that one morally ought to follow the 
original(ist) law and acting accordingly.  
Hence, radical abolitionists before the Reconstruction Amendments, 
who made originalist arguments about the place of slavery in the 
Constitution and used that as a reason to deny the Constitution moral 
authority, could not have been originalists according to the authors.73 Those 
abolitionists arguably had moral reasons to be originalists (it may have been 
morally valuable to show that the Constitution was morally bad), but those 
reasons were not moral reasons to obey the Constitution.  
One of the major advantages of positivism is that it allows very 
straightforwardly to conclude that something is law in a perfectly ordinary 
sense and at the same time there are no moral reasons to follow it. It is a 
simple, but common, error to equate “practical relevance” of an account of 
law with the issue of whether (and how) that account justifies a moral 
obligation to obey the law.74 In fact, if one does not assume that a particular 
natural law theory is correct, then it is easy to conclude that such theory is 
devoid of any practical significance. Because if it is not correct, it is just 
someone’s personal view on what should be the case. Why would anyone 
else care about that?  
In contrast, accounts of actual legal practices (what Professors 
Pojanowski and Walsh disparage as mere “descriptions about others’ 
beliefs”75) are always of practical relevance. One cannot even begin 
contemplating what one ought to do without having this sort of knowledge 
about the world.76 Yes, to decide what one ought to do one also needs a 
                                                
70 Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, supra note 3, at 822. 
71 Pojanowski and Walsh, supra note 2, at 109, 114–116. 
72 Id. at 116. 
73 See, e.g., WENDELL PHILLIPS, THE CONSTITUTION A PRO-SLAVERY COMPACT; 
OR, EXTRACTS FROM THE MADISON PAPERS, &C. (1844); LYSANDER SPOONER, NO 
TREASON, NO. VI.: THE CONSTITUTION OF NO AUTHORITY (1870). I am not saying 
they were correct by modern methodological standards; see, e.g., LYSANDER 
SPOONER, THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY (1860); Helen J. Knowles, 
Securing the “Blessings of Liberty” for All: Lysander Spooner’s Originalism, 5 
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF LAW & LIBERTY 34–62 (2010). 
74 See, e.g, Pojanowski and Walsh, supra note 2, at 116. 
75 Id. at 116. 
76 Another way in which Professors Pojanowski and Walsh mischaracterize 
practical relevance of positivism is when they claim that the only response a 
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first-order normative theory, but there are good reasons to separate the two. 
One such good reason is that first-order normative theories tend to be rather 
contentious, to put it mildly.  
Importantly, there is significant confusion around the charge, repeated 
several times in “Enduring Originalism”, that legal positivists are 
exclusively interested in “neutral description” of the law.77 Proper 
understanding of this issue will help in assessing the relative merits of 
positivist and natural law originalisms. 
First, at the current stage of the debate on methodology of legal 
philosophy it is misleading to describe legal positivism as aiming to be 
“neutral,” “purely descriptive,” or even “normatively inert.”78 In an 
important sense, no theory of anything can achieve that. This is as true about 
mathematics and physics, as it is about jurisprudence.79 What makes it 
harder to see this fact is that in some fields (like mathematics), the 
methodological criteria are more entrenched and less controversial as a 
matter of sociology of the discipline. However, it is naïve not to notice that 
judgements of beauty or simplicity that ground many more advanced 
mathematical debates are not “objective” or “purely descriptive” (even 
though, importantly, they are not moral judgments). Methodological criteria 
used may be more or less controversial within a community, but it is futile 
to seek the “objective” ones. 
No methodologically self-aware positivist can deny the crucial role of 
evaluative and normative judgments for her enterprise. An important and 
underappreciated issue is that different kinds of judgements are made on 
different levels, or stages of inquiry. Why be a legal philosopher instead of a 
medical doctor? This is, partly, a moral question. What methodological 
values to pursue in one’s account of the law? Certainly an evaluative and 
normative question. Is it, at least partly, a moral question? I am inclined to 
say yes.  
                                                                                                                        
positivist may have to “a renegade Justice” rebelling against the current positive 
law (including the current content of the rule of recognition) is to wait and see 
whether this Justice and his friends succeed in changing the law; Id. at 114. 
I cannot see what inspired that conclusion. If the Justice in question really is 
“rebelling,” i.e. there is settled law against which he is acting, then there is plenty 
of weapons in a perfectly ordinary legal arsenal to fight that. The Justice is acting 
unlawfully, can be criticized for that and perhaps even lawfully punished. “[A]ll 
that succeeds is success” grounds no legal protection for law-breaking before that 
law-breaking succeeds to change the law; see HART, supra note 13, at 153. 
77 Id. at 103, 109, 110, 114. 
78 Julie Dickson’s work is magisterial in this respect, see JULIE DICKSON, 
EVALUATION AND LEGAL THEORY (2001). 
79 See, e.g., Brian Leiter, Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate: The Methodology 
Problem in Jurisprudence, 48 AM. J. JURIS. 17, 34–35 (2003). 
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The mistake that some natural lawyers make is not to see the possibility 
that evaluative, normative, even moral, judgements about how to pursue a 
field of inquiry may yield a methodology that, in turn, does not include any 
direct moral evaluations (even though, inevitably, it will involve other kinds 
of evaluation). Some legal positivists, as Professors Pojanowski and Walsh 
recognize in a footnote, have provided arguments of this sort.80 What the 
authors do not admit is that positivism is not tied to utilitarianism or a 
specific “conception of human persons.”81 One can imagine a natural law 
account of positivist methodology (even of the exclusive sort).82 That no 
one so far tried is a merely contingent fact about personal interests of legal 
philosophers. 
It is not in itself a problem that some positivists do not write about those 
issues, or at least do not focus on them. We do not criticize front-line 
mathematicians, physicists, or even sociologists, for not being at the same 
time theorists of mathematical, physical or sociological methodology. The 
question is whether the methodology in question is justifiable, especially in 
comparison with available alternatives. I cannot hope to address this issue 
fully in this short note. However, I will note that much, if not the 
overwhelming majority, of the discipline shares the methodological values 
that underlie the work of Professors Baude and Sachs and find the 
framework relied on by Professors Pojanowski and Walsh interesting, but 
ultimately unconvincing. Perhaps we are all wrong. But how likely it is that 
we are wrong in as facile a way as the authors present it? 
What is more, positivists (i.e. those who subscribe to legal positivism) 
are clearly very much interested in direct moral evaluation of the law. They 
are also interested in moral questions like the question when, if at all, people 
have moral duties to obey the law. Positivists refuse only to start their 
inquiry with an assumption of moral value of the law or of existence of a 
moral duty to obey. Why?  
In a powerful discussion cited but not addressed adequately by the 
authors,83 Professor Sachs gives a partial answer: no method of legal 
interpretation can be the law in virtue of being morally or philosophically 
                                                
80 Pojanowski and Walsh, supra note 2, at 23 n.149. 
81 Id. at 23 n.149. 
82 Such an account would not necessarily be “positivity-welcoming,” i.e. it need not 
claim that there is specific moral value to originalist law. (On the notion of 
“positivity-welcoming” see Gardner, Legal Positivism: 5½ Myths, in LAW AS A 
LEAP OF FAITH, supra note 9, at 26–29.) The moral claim could be on a different 
level. Perhaps, a “practically reasonable” legal philosopher ought to be a positivist. 
Or in other words: morality requires the kind of legal philosophy that allows for the 
possibility that immoral or unjust legal systems (e.g. Soviet law) are not defective 
as legal systems. 
83 Pojanowski and Walsh, supra note 2, at 103–106. 
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required.84 Whatever a clever philosopher can come up with as an account 
of what the law should be, that is in itself irrelevant to what the law is here 
and now. It just cannot be that “the entire society [is] getting its own law 
wrong, all the way down.”85  
It is not a goal of positivism to stop anyone from asking questions about 
existence of duties to obey the law. To the contrary. Positivism is, in a 
sense, a “plug-and-play” theory of law for a moral philosopher. Irrespective 
of which account of whether people morally ought to do X one accepts, 
legal positivism provides an X. Positive originalism provides an even more 
specific X.  
As Professors Pojanowski and Walsh show (even though they do not 
stress that), modern natural law theory may be used to support the claim that 
there are moral reasons to obey US constitutional law if it happens to be 
originalist (i.e. if Professors Baude and Sachs are correct). This is not trivial, 
though it is not as ambitious as Professors Pojanowski and Walsh might 
want. They seem to be saying that US law is originalist because it morally 
should be (or more accurately: the judges should choose to make it 
originalist for that reason), not that it merely happens to be originalist as 
matter of fact and that is a morally good thing, as in my version.  
However, positive originalism may work with other moral theories too. 
Professor Baude favours a view focused on normative significance of 
official oath.86 Professors Pojanowski and Walsh are unimpressed.87 We can 
expect other accounts to be offered in the future.  
So who provides the best reason to be an originalist? Professors 
Pojanowski and Walsh tell us that:  
To be more than a history of Supreme Court attitudes and practices, 
the positive turn needs an account of why legal officials and 
citizens should treat these attitudes and resulting norms as having 
authoritative force (or not) on their consciences.88 
Once we properly see the method of positive originalism as more like 
sociology of the practices that constitute the foundations of US law than 
“a history of Supreme Court attitudes and practices,” then it is much easier 
to recognize the benefits of this approach. This method yields as close a 
picture of the settled law as possible. If there is no sufficient overlap in 
                                                
84 Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, supra note 3, at 828–35. 
85 Id. at 835. 
86 Baude, supra note 3, at 2392–97. See also Richard M. Re, Promising the 
Constitution, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 299 (2016). 
87 Pojanowski and Walsh, supra note 2, at 115. 
88 Id. at 114–115. 
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individual attitudes of legal officials to ground some higher-order principle 
as part of the rule of recognition, then it is not a part of the rule of 
recognition. If it can be shown that more than a small minority of legal 
officials reject the higher-order principles described by Professor Sachs, 
then positive originalism is falsified. If there really is more than one 
sufficiently prominent “official story,” then there is no settled law on that 
point.89 That’s it. End of story. To be able to brush this aside, natural law 
originalists must focus, as they do, on what they think the law should be, as 
opposed to what in fact is practiced as law. But once that is clearly admitted, 
the pull of natural law originalism will probably only be felt by those who 
already are natural lawyers.  
VII. CONCLUSION	
The kind of reasoning that Professors Pojanowski and Walsh develop 
has rhetorical force. They criticize living constitutionalists for trying to 
switch “the soul of our Constitution from one that approaches immortality to 
another that dies and is reborn every day.”90 To establish what is “the soul 
of the Constitution,” the authors employ plausible arguments about what 
morality requires and about how this was understood historically by the 
some of those involved in the making of the Constitution. If someone is 
already convinced that such arguments translate into legal arguments 
because of the nature of law, i.e. if someone already is a natural lawyer, they 
will likely find the entire reasoning convincing. However, for the rest of us, 
the move from the moral to the legal will remain implausible. This is not to 
say that “Enduring Originalism” is not important for positive originalists. If 
Professors Pojanowski and Walsh are correct about the first stage, viz. if it 
cannot be established that there are, as a matter of current legal practice, 
higher-order principles grounding supremacy of the original law, then 
positive originalism is falsified.  
                                                
89 See Id. at 153.  
90 Id. at 157. 
